摘要
“花钱买稳定”是权威主义国家维持政治稳定的一个引人注目的策略.本文试图探讨,究竟是哪些机制在“花钱买稳定”过程中扮演着关键角色.文章运用相关性与结构-行动方法,以中国的医疗纠纷为研究对象,着重讨论了三大关键机制:行动者的破坏强度、基层政府部门之间协同行动的能力,以及不同产权关系下的政治依附性.三大机制共同发挥作用,深刻地影响到医疗纠纷赔偿方案中的个人、医院和基层政府.在围绕医疗纠纷赔偿方案的讨价还价上,三个机制不同的表现方式和影响程度使得三方互动的结果高度不确定;基层政府能够运用各种资源,主导纠纷的发展轨迹,建立起对地方秩序的支配地位.分析“花钱买稳定”的关键机制,有助于理解权威主义政治韧性的问题.
" Buying stability with money " is a striking tactic, which authoritarian regime intends to sustain its resilience. This paper attempts to make sure which kinds of mechanism operate in that process. A relevant and structure-action approach will be used to analyze following three sets of critical mechanisms in the case of medical disputes: the extent of disruptive action, capacity for administrative sectors to collaborate, and the dependence of hospitals on grassroots governments. These mechanisms combine to play a significant role in the "bargaining" process in which the grieved, individual hospital, and local government are involved. On the issue of how much should be paid off or gained, the uncertainty, with those mechanisms functioning, leads to highly uncertain consequences, with different compensation case by case. But what is certain is that local governments could employ various resources to dominate the bargaining process and constitute the dominance in maintaining local-level security. To spell out those critical mechanisms working in the process of "buying stability with money" helps understand why authoritarian regime could remain constantly resilient.
出处
《复旦政治学评论》
CSSCI
2016年第2期141-174,共34页
Fudan Political Science Review
