摘要
文章运用演化博弈理论,分析政府环境规制与企业治污行为演化博弈过程及其可能存在的多重均衡,提出环境规制强度与企业全要素生产率存在门槛效应假说。选取2011~2020年我国39个行业共3,221,580个样本工业企业构成的平衡面板数据与相关环境规制数据,采用Levinsohn和Petrin (2003)估计方法测算企业全要素生产率,使用面板门槛模型进行实证检验。经验证据表明:1) 对于整体行业而言,环境规制强度与企业全要素生产率之间存在倒U型关系,即二者存在先升后降的关系。2) 将整体行业根据污染程度划分为低、中、高三类,在轻度污染行业中二者为正相关;在重度污染行业中二者为负相关;而在中度污染行业中二者存在“U”型关系。研究发现支持门槛效应假说。环境规制强度对企业全要素生产率在不同行业产生不同的影响效应,在演化博弈理论框架下得到合理的解释。
Using evolutionary game theory, this paper analyzes the evolutionary game process and possible multiple equilibrium between government environmental regulation and enterprise pollution control behavior, and puts forward the hypothesis that there is a threshold effect between the intensity of environmental regulation and enterprise total factor productivity. Select the balanced panel data and relevant environmental regulation data of 3,221,580 industrial enterprises in 39 industries in China from 2011 to 2020, use Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimation methods to calculate the total factor productivity of enterprises, and use the panel threshold model for empirical test. Empirical evidences show that: 1) For the whole industry, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the intensity of environmental regulation and the total factor productivity of enterprises, that is, the relationship between the two increases first and then decreases. 2) After the whole industry is divided into three categories: low, medium and high according to the degree of pollution, in the light pollution industry, the two are positively correlated;the two are negatively correlated in heavily polluted industries;There is a “U” relationship between the two in moderately polluting industries. The findings support the threshold effect hypothesis. The intensity of environmental regulations has different effects on the total factor productivity of enterprises in different industries, which can be reasonably explained in the framework of evolutionary game theory.
出处
《电子商务评论》
2024年第3期4142-4157,共16页
E-Commerce Letters
