摘要
清代的乡村治理面临着既需要借助乡村社会组织的力量,又要防止乡村社会势力过大的矛盾局面。学界往往以“皇权不下县”来概括古代乡村治理的模式,并就此进行了深入的讨论和研究,但较少从制度变迁和权力互动的视角进行展开。佐杂分防制作为清王朝控制乡村的一种政治尝试,是正式制度与非正式制度的混合产物。在国家和社会的双方博弈中,分辖于乡村的佐杂官与里甲、保甲、宗族等组织围绕治安权、司法权、赋役代征权等权力的归属问题进行互动,在一定程度上实现了治理场域的均衡,但国家力量仍然无法摆脱社会力量而独立运转。对于当下,培育乡村自组织力量也许是实现治理有效的一种可行路径。
Rural governance in the Qing Dynasty faced the contradictory situation of needing to draw on the power of rural social organizations while preventing excessive rural social power. Academic circles often summarize the ancient rural governance model as “imperial power does not extend to counties” and have conducted in-depth discussions and research on this, but rarely from the perspective of institutional change and power interaction. As a political attempt by the Qing Dynasty to control the countryside, the Subcounty officials were a mixture of formal and informal systems. In the game between the state and society, the assist miscellaneous officials in the countryside interacted with Lijia, Baojia, clan and other organizations around the ownership of powers such as public security power, judicial power, and the right to collect taxes and levies. To a certain extent, this was achieved the balance of the governance field has been achieved, but state power still cannot operate independently from social forces. For the present, cultivating rural self-organizing power may be a feasible way to achieve effective governance.
出处
《社会科学前沿》
2024年第4期180-189,共10页
Advances in Social Sciences
