摘要
藉由对布伦塔诺时间观的批判,胡塞尔从主体性感知出发,阐释意识对象的构造活动。这一批判的主要影响在于:一方面,承认了布伦塔诺基于原初联想时间性描述对现象学时间观具有启发意义;另一方面,使其对时间性意识对象的分析突破了“实存客体”的界限。基于此,胡塞尔才能从现象学出发,对意识对象的实在性问题展开全新的探讨。从论证的结果来看,胡塞尔由意识对象自身的内在统一性,以及意识对象在时间相位上的持续相合两方面,论述时间性意识对象的构建活动。
By criticizing Brentano’s concept of time, Husserl explained the construction of conscious objects from the perception of subjectivity. The main impact of this critique is that: on the one hand, it admits Brentano’s enlightening significance to the phenomenological view of time based on the original associative description of temporal object effects;on the other hand, it breaks through the boundary of “existent objects” in its analysis of time conscious objects. In this regard, Husserl can start from the phenomenological view of time and start a new discussion on the reality of consciousness. Judging from the results of the demonstration, Husserl discusses the construction of temporal conscious objects from the two aspects of the internal unity of the conscious objects themselves and the continuous coincidence of the conscious objects in terms of time phase.
出处
《哲学进展》
2023年第6期1240-1245,共6页
Advances in Philosophy
