限价与公益性下药品双渠道供应链权力结构模型被引量：9

Power Structure for Pharmaceutical Dual-channel Supply Chain under Price Cap Policy and Public Welfare

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摘要考虑限价政策和医疗机构公益性影响,分别构建了以医疗机构和药品供应商为主导的药品双渠道供应链权力结构模型,进而分析了医疗机构公益性、药品限价政策等的影响,最后通过两种权力结构的均衡结果对比,揭示了权力结构差异对供应链绩效和社会福利的影响。研究发现:医疗机构主导下,限价政策仅抑制医疗机构药品售价,而对网上渠道药价无影响;药品供应商主导下,限价政策可同时抑制两条渠道的药品价格。在限价约束下,当医疗机构主导时,降低最高限价可同时提高药品供应链利润和社会整体福利;而药品供应商主导下仅提高社会整体福利。当不受限价约束时,两种权力结构下,提高医疗机构公益性可以同时增加药品供应链利润和社会整体福利。相比于医疗机构主导情形,供应商主导下药品双渠道供应链价格较低,患者剩余较大,而供应链利润较小。 Taking the price cap policy and the public welfare of medical institutions into consideration,we establish two Stackelberg game models,which are dominated by the medical institutions and pharmaceutical supplier respectively.Then we analyze the impacts of price cap policy and public welfare of medical institutions on the equilibriums.By comparing the equilibriums under two kinds of different power structures,we illustrate the impacts of different power constructs on supply chain performance and social welfare.The studies show that under the medical institutions dominated model,the price cap policy limits the medical institutions price,while has no impact on online price.Under the pharmaceutical supplier dominated model,the price cap policy limits both the online price and medical institutions price.Under the constraint of price cap,decreasing the price cap can improve both the supply chain profit and public welfare of medical institutions in the medical institution dominated model,while in the pharmaceutical supplier dominated model,decreasing the price cap can only improve the public welfare of medical institutions.Without the constraint of price cap,increasing public welfare of medical institutions not only increases the pharmaceutical supply chain profit,but also increases social welfare under two kinds of different dominated models.Comparing with the medical institutions dominated model,the pricing of pharmaceutical of medical institutions and supply chain profit are lower than those in the pharmaceutical supplier dominated model,while the patient’s surplus is higher.

作者李诗杨但斌李红霞张海月 Li Shiyang;Dan Bin;Li Hongxia;Zhang Haiyue(School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044;Chongqing Key Laboratory of Logistics at Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044;College of Management,Chongqing University of technology,Chongqing 400054)

机构地区重庆大学经济与工商管理学院重庆大学现代物流重庆市重点实验室重庆理工大学管理学院

出处《管理评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2019年第9期266-277,共12页 Management Review

基金国家自然科学基金项目(71572020 71272086)

关键词药品供应链双渠道医疗机构公益性限价政策权力结构 pharmaceutical dual-channel supply chain public welfare of medical institutions price cap policy power structure

分类号 R95 [医药卫生—药学] F426.72 [经济管理—产业经济]