摘要
历史是至关重要的,现在、未来和过去都是通过连续性的各种社会制度联系在一起的。社会制度作为"制度的内生规则",既是博弈的规则也是博弈的均衡结果。给定一个初始的均衡状态,处于同一个支付框架内不同受益地位的群体出于改善自身受益的动机,在推动制度变迁上会产生不同的作用。随机演化的制度是长期内在稳定的,极端不平等的社会现状更加容易使得制度发生变迁,突发性历史事件往往在最终推动制度变迁上起着至关重要的作用,这种冲突性制度变迁更能够解释规模行动的有效性和制度变迁在较短历史时期内发生的可能性。
History is important;present,future and past are combined with various institutions which are coming into succession.As endogenous-rules-of-the-game,institutions are not only the rules of a game but also can be seen as the equi- librium of a game.Given an equilibrium as the initial case,different groups play different roles to promote the institutional change,along with the different benefits getting from the initial.An institution is steady-going as an equilibrium of a game on evolutionary of random.However,inequality in the extremity may impulse institutional change easily,as well as the affairs broken out without anticipate play an important role.Thus,institutional change as a conflict can explain the validity of col- lective-action driving the institutional change and the possibility of generating during a shorter time.
出处
《中南财经政法大学研究生学报》
2008年第5期84-92,共9页
Journal of the Postgraduate of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law
关键词
制度变迁
随机演化
特异博弈
规模行动
Institutional Change
A Game on Evolutionary of Random
Idiosyncratic Play
Collective-Action
