摘要
在网购供应链中,网络零售商要求供应商通过第三方物流服务提供商直接向消费者发货,以减少中途的运输环节,最大限度的节约物流费用,但是由于第三方物流服务提供商的收入增长依赖于网络零售商物流费用的增长,所以积极配合零售商优化网购供应链的意愿不高。常见的物流合同难以有效的协调第三方物流服务提供商和网络零售商之间的利益冲突,本文在运用博弈模型分析常见的物流外包合同的基础上,引入共享节约合同,设计一种有效的内在激励机制,以达到激励双方共同努力节约物流成本的目的。并通过实例分析验证了这一共享节约合同的有效性,指出其能使合作双方利润都得以优化,有利于达到系统最优,实现帕累托改进。
In the online shopping supply chain,online retailers require suppliers to ship directly to consumers through third-party logistics service providers i order to reduce the midway transport links and save logistics costs to the hilt. However,because revenue growth of the third-party logistics service provider depends on the growth of online retailers' logistics costs,the will of active cooperation with retailers to optimize the supply chain of omline shopping is not high. Common logistics contracts are difficult to effectively coordinate the conflict of interests between the third-party logistics service providers and network retailers. On the basis of use of common logistice outsourcing contract in the game,the shared savings contract is introduced to design an effective internal incentive in order to encourage both sides to work together to save the logistics cost. Furthermore,the validity of the shared savings vontrave is verified through case analysis,noting that it can optimize the dual profits and assist in achieving the system optimization to realize Pareto improvement.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第S1期539-545,共7页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71362029
71262031)
云南省中青年学术和技术带头人后备人才(2014HB009)
云南省级立项支持新增一级学科博士点学科建设规划(应用经济学)
云南师范大学"十二五"学科建设项目(一层次应用经济学)
关键词
共享节约
第三方物流
外包
博弈
shared savings
third-party logistics
outsourcing
game
