摘要
在景区和旅行社构成的两级旅游供应链中,通过Stackelberg博弈理论研究了旅游供应链中各成员的决策策略,探讨了景区和旅行社均衡解之间的关系。其次,引入收益共享契约缓解利润分配不公平引起的渠道冲突,给出了设计契约时共享参数间的关系式,分析了实现旅游供应链完美协调存在的条件。最后通过数值分析,验证了收益共享契约设计的科学性,发现了契约因子在一定范围内可以让景区和旅行社利润均有所增加,实现Pareto改进,达到旅游供应链整体最优的状态。
In a tourism supply chain composed of a scenic spot and a travel agent,this paper analyses price strategies of each member by Stackelberg game theory,and studies the relationship between the equilibrium solutions of the scenic spot and the travel agent.Through comparison of every profit,a revenue sharing contract is introduced to reduce the channel conflict caused by unfair profit distribution,and the calculation formula of the range of contract parameters are given.Furthermore,the paper discusses the condition of perfect coordination in tourism supply chain.Finally,a numerical example is used to verify the results and effectiveness of tourism supply chain coordination which is design by revenue sharing contract.Meanwhile,under revenue sharing contract the scenic spot and the travel agent both gain their profits more than that under decentralized decision without contracts,and realize their Pareto improvement to achieve the optimal state of tourism supply chain.
出处
《系统工程》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第1期124-129,共6页
Systems Engineering
基金
安徽省自然科学基金资助项目(1608085MG152)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70901002)
安徽师范大学2014年研究生科研创新项目(2014yks106zd)
