摘要
工资集体协商是一个企业与劳动者之间进行利益博弈的过程,对于协调劳动关系、实现劳资双赢具有重要意义。本文通过构建企业工资集体协商的演化博弈模型,通过局部稳定分析及绘制系统相图,分析了劳动者与企业的复动制态和演化稳定策略,揭示了工资协商中的演化进程。研究表明:当劳动者以较高的概率选择引发冲突策略时,企业趋向于选择增加工资策略;反之,则不太可能满足劳动者要求;劳动者在理性前提下,只要冲突的收益大于成本,都将趋近于选择引发冲突策略。基于此,本文从法律条规和主体意识方面,提出了在现有格局下保护劳动者权益的对策建议。
Collective wage consultation is a gambling process between laborers and the enterprise,which is crucial to coordinate labor relations and realize a win- win situation.By building evolutionary game model of the two groups,the replicated dynamics and evolutionary stable strategy(ESS) are analyzed.The results are;the enterprises would choose the 'increasing wage quantity' strategy when labors are very likely to choose the 'triggering conflicts',otherwise they are less likely to do it.When the earnings of leading to conflict outweigh the costs,the laborers would choose the 'triggering conflicts'.Finally,from the view of legal regulation and subject consciousness,some proposals for protecting the laborers' rights are put forward.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第S1期1-7,共7页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
关键词
工资集体协商
演化博弈
稳定分析
collective wage consultation
evolutionary game
stability analysis
