摘要
该文通过N个供应商的古诺博奕模型,在市场需求完全无弹性、发电供应商具有线性边际成本并且规模不等的情况下,讨论了统一的边际出清电价机制下发电商持留量的古诺均衡,分析了该持留量与市场上发电商的数目、发电商的相对差异度指标及发电商的市场份额的关系,并得出每个发电商容量持留的市场临界需求水平,确定了市场上不发生持留的发电商的市场份额上限与市场需求和其边际容量段的关系,并通过选取合适的市场临界需求水平确定发电商市场份额上限.
An N-player Cournot game model is employed in this paper, based on linear marginal cost functions, asymmetry of the generating firms, inelastic demand, and complete information for pool and government. The solutions show that withholding incentive always exists and the total withholding increases with the increase of the extent of heterogeneity of the generating firm, numbers of the firms and electricity demand. The analysis shows that every generator has a threshold level of market demand, below which no withholding occurs and above which the withholding is profitable, and the upper limit of firm's share decreases with an increase of the demand and a decrease of marginal capacity segment. The upper limit of firm's share can be ascertained by selecting an appropriate threshold level of market demand.
出处
《上海大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
CSCD
2003年第6期549-552,557,共5页
Journal of Shanghai University:Natural Science Edition
基金
国家自然科学基金 (5993 71 50 )资助项目
