摘要
本文基于现有的关于交易成本的研究通常集中在以产权为核心的交换过程 ,而对宏观调控层面可能会引起交易成本的分析没有受到应有关注的事实 ,认为新制度分析包含着政策层面上的交易成本思想 ,政府的宏观调控会导致投资选择的交易成本。文章根据投资者在投资选择过程中是否承担以及在多大程度上承担由政策引致的交易成本 ,将投资者在某时期的最终定位划分为三大集群 ,在给出相应的基本平衡式的基础上 ,运用交易成本范畴对投资者的投资选择作出了一种间接博弈的解释。本文的分析在一定程度上说明了现实投资容易偏离宏观调控的原因。
Based on the fact that the researches on transaction costs are usually focused on the process whose core spirits are property rights while the analyses of transactions induced by macro-regulation are ignored, this article thinks that a new institutional analysis should involve in policy transaction thoughts, that is, government's macro-regulation will lead to transaction costs of investment choice. According to the fact whether the investor will pay for the transaction costs induced by policy during the investment process and how much he will pay, the article divides the investors' final positions of a certain period into three different groups. Based on the corresponding basic equilibrium equations, the article gives out an indirect game explanation to the investors' investment choice while using transaction costs' category analysis. The analysis of this article makes clear in some degrees the reasons why the actual investments tend to depart from macro-regulation.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2003年第12期52-59,共8页
Economic Research Journal
