摘要
企业成长风险带来的信息缺失使得投资者更难监管融资方的道德风险.本文基于鲁棒决策方法,构建了审慎乐观的企业在面临成长风险下的股权融资模型,探讨了投融资双方的委托代理问题对企业股权融资的影响.研究发现:委托代理问题抑制了企业的股权融资和快速发展,企业体现出更为保守的特征;提高成长性均值、降低批发价格或提高委托代理下的企业估值均可提高企业的风险承受能力.同时,在投资低估值、高成长性均值或低成长风险的企业时,投资者让渡经营权会导致其利益受到双重损害.
It is more difficult for the investor to monitor entrepreneur’s moral hazard under growth risk due to the lack of information.To solve this problem,present study employed robust method to construct an equity financing model of cautiously optimistic entrepreneur facing growth risk,and to investigate the effect of agency problem on equity financing.Results indicate that the enterprise becomes more conservative under agency problem,which inhibits the equity financing and rapid development of the enterprise.Increasing the mean growth,reducing the wholesale price,or improving the enterprise valuation under the agency problem can improve the risk tolerance of the enterprise.In addition,handing over the management rights to the entrepreneur does harm to investor’s benefit when investing the enterprise with high valuation,high growth mean or low growth risk.
作者
王宇
于辉
WANG Yu;YU Hui(School of Management,Chongqing University of Technology,Chongqing 400054,China;School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400030,China)
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2019年第5期1091-1104,共14页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
国家自然科学基金(71571024
71872021)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项(2018CDJSK02XK17)~~
