摘要
考虑一个零售商初始资金不足、供应商资金量不确定、市场需求为随机的两级供应链模型,其中零售商可以仓单融资后进行二次订购.对应零售商不同的初始资金量,给出了其二次订货的最优仓单抵押率及最优订购决策,说明了零售商资金约束会加大供应链的"双边际效应".另外,为协调零售商资金严重不足时的供应链提供了改进的收益共享合约.给出了供应链协调时的最优批发价格,并对协调原则进行了分析.最后通过算例对文中的结论进行验证.
This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain model with a finance insufficient retailer and a capital uncertain supplier, in which the market demand is random, and the retailer has a second ordering chance with warehouse receipts mortgage financing before the selling season. Corresponding to the retailer＇s different initial capitals, the paper gives the best mortgage rate for the retailer＇s second order and its optimal order policy, and shows that the retailer＇s capital constraint will increase the ＂double marginalization＂ of the supply chain. Furthermore, an improved revenue-sharing contract is provided in order to coordinate the supply chain with a severely underfunded retailer. The optimum wholesale prices in the supply chain coordination are given, and the coordination principle is analyzed. Finally, the conclusions in this paper are confirmed by an example.
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2015年第5期671-681,共11页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272085)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(12YJA630135)
郑州大学14青年教师启动基金资助项目(58020620)
关键词
融资
仓单抵押率
供应链
协调
financial
warehouse receipts mortgage rate
supply chain
coordination
