摘要
基于我国沪、深A股2010年至2014年上市公司数据,从机构投资者异质性视角,实证检验了管理层权力与资本配置效率的关系。结果表明,管理层权力与非效率投资总额及投资过度、投资不足之间呈现显著的正相关关系,这种正相关关系只在过度的管理层权力组成立。进一步研究发现,机构投资者异质性对管理层权力与资本配置效率的关系发挥显著的负向调节作用,较之交易型机构投资者来说,稳定型机构投资者能够显著降低管理层权力与非效率投资总额及投资过度之间的正相关关系。本文的结果对提高我国资源配置效率,加强对管理层权力约束机制的建立和完善等,以及对完善我国资本市场中机构投资者发展具有一定的参考意义。
Based on China A-listed companies' data from year 2010 to 2014in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges,and from perspective of institution investors heterogeneity,this paper empirically investigated the relationship between management power and capital allocation efficiency.The results showed that,there was a significantly positive relationship between management power and total inefficiency capital investment,over-investment and under-investment.However,this positive relationship was only stand in over-management power samples.Further analysis found that,there was a significantly negative mediation effect of institution investors heterogeneity on the relationship between management power and total investment inefficiency,over-investment and under-investment.That is to say,compared with non-stable institution investors,stable institution investors can effectively decrease the positive relationship between management power and total investment inefficiency,over-investment and under-investment.This paper brings some suggestions on how to enhance our country's capital allocation efficiency,to strengthen the management power constraint mechanism,as well as to improve the development of institutional investors in China.
出处
《现代财经(天津财经大学学报)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第1期78-89,共12页
Modern Finance and Economics:Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
关键词
管理层权力
机构投资者异质性
投资过度
投资不足
management power
institutional investor heterogeneity
over-investment
under-investment