摘要
正确的激励机制必须建立在可观察、可证实的业绩评估基础之上。经营能力是一种隐藏信息,业绩评估中也存在着大量的隐藏信息和隐藏行动,在此条件下,国有产权的某些特殊性往往会引发经营者选择过程中的逆向选择和业绩评估中的双向道德风险,从而决定了提供公共卫生服务和为特殊群体提供个人医疗服务的公立医疗机构的治理最终将采取固定工资合同和公共部门式管理,而不是两权分离之下任何形式的国有民营。
A sound incentive mechanism should b e established and based on an observable and verifiable performance evaluation.The abilit y of running business is a hidden info rmation,there are also lots of hidden informa tion and action in the process of performa nce evaluation.Some special characteristics of certain state property ownership can incurnegative selection and two way moral hazard in the business operation and performance evaluation,which illustrates that the fix salary contract and the a pproaches of public sector manageme nt might be the appropriate structur e for public hospitals governance instead of oth er forms of corporatization under th e condition of separation of the right of ownership and right of operation.
出处
《中国医院管理》
北大核心
2003年第12期1-5,共5页
Chinese Hospital Management
