摘要
高新技术产业化过程中,技术需要资本的支持,资本也在寻找高潜质的投资项目,资本和技术在相互寻找和选择中进行着博弈。本文研究风险投资中资本与技术的博弈,构建并解析防止合作前后的逆向选择和道德风险的信号博弈模型和Bayes估计的动态模型,指出在风险投资市场中,技术最终还是被资本所雇佣,由此资本所有者将设计一系列的激励相容的契约安排。
In the process of industrialization of new techniques, technique needs the support of capital, while the capital is searching for investment projects with good techniques. So game exists in the mutual search and selection of capital and technique.Studying the game of capital and technique in venture capital, the paper constructs and analyzes how to prevent adverse selection before and after the cooperation, the signal model of moral hazard and the dynamic model of Bayes evaluation.It points out that in the venture capital investment market,technique is finally engaged by capital, and the possessor of capital will design a series of incentive compatibility arrangement of contract.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2003年第11期56-60,共5页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
江苏省软科学计划项目(2002019)
关键词
风险投资
博弈
非对称信息
契约安排
venture capital
game
asymmetry information
arrangement of contract
