摘要
在中小企业对技术创新项目进行融资的过程中,风险投资是其融资的一个重要途径,而风险投资人与风险企业之间会因利益的分配展开博弈。通过建立风险投资人与风险企业之间的博弈模型,可以看出风险企业对利润率高的技术创新项目进行风险融资的可行性并不高,所以风险投资人应谨慎选择风险企业进行投资,以降低资金风险。
As small and medium- sized enterprises finance for their innovative technology projects, venture capital is always an important resource. Venture capital investors and venture enterprises often initiate their games because of benefit division. Through setting up and analyzing the game modal between venture capital investors and venture enterprises, this paper concludes that the feasibility of obtaining venture capital for high profit margin is not high. It suggests that venture capital investor should be cautious in selecting venture enterprises to lower the risks of capital.
出处
《商业研究》
北大核心
2005年第20期68-70,共3页
Commercial Research
关键词
技术创新
风险投资
混同均衡
technological innovation
venture investment
pooling equilibrium
