摘要
本文基于信号传递理论探讨资本市场中投资者、企业决策者和分析师的动态博弈,并通过实证检验揭示分析师预测是否会促进企业创新。研究结果表明,分析师预测覆盖率的提高和数量的增加能为企业带来信息效应,从而缓解融资约束并促进企业创新;但分析师预测对每股收益的关注会对企业形成压力效应,引起企业管理层短视,从而抑制企业创新。进一步研究发现,机构投资者的实地调研频率增加会增强分析师预测报告的信息效应并削弱压力效应。本文的结论为分析师改进预测报告、消弭资本市场动态博弈中的信息不对称提供了借鉴。
Based on the theory of signaling,this paper discusses the dynamic game between investors,corporate decision makers and analysts in the capital market,and reveals whether analyst predictions can promote corporate innovation through empirical testing.The research results show that the improvement of analysts'forecast coverage and quantity can bring information effects to enterprises,thereby alleviating financing constraints and promoting enterprise innovation;however,analysts predict that the focus on earnings per share will cause pressure effects on enterprises and cause enterprise management layers of short-sighted and thus inhibit corporate innovation.Further research found that an increase in the frequency of field research by institutional investors would enhance the informational effect of analysts'forecast reports and alleviate the pressure effect.The conclusion of this paper provides a reference for analysts to improve forecast reports and eliminate information asymmetry in the dynamic game of capital market.
作者
吴迪
赵奇锋
Wu Di;Zhao Qifeng(School of Insurance,Shandong University of Finance and Economics,Jinan 250014,China;Institute of Quantitative Economy and Technological Economy,China Economic and Social Development and Intelligent Governance Laboratory,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 100732,China)
出处
《南开经济研究》
北大核心
2023年第2期140-160,共21页
Nankai Economic Studies
基金
山东省社科规划项目“山东省中小企业‘专精特新’梯度培育评价体系构建研究”(22DGLJ13)的阶段性研究成果。
关键词
企业创新
动态博弈
信息不对称
信号传递
分析师预测
Enterprise Innovation
Dynamic Game
Information Asymmetry
Signal Transmission
Analyst Forcast
