摘要
本文通过建立一个两阶段的博弈模型来分析我国移动市场上的寡头竞争行为。同时,通过计算社会最优的质量和福利水平,说明寡头垄断相对于社会计划者而言,生产的产品质量太低,而且导致了较低的社会福利水平。寡头垄断在产品质量选择和定价方面的扭曲,说明了电信行业打破垄断、引入竞争的必要性。
By the 2-stage game -theoretic models, this paper explores the oligopolistic behaviors in the product selection and price competition processes. By computing the social optimal quality selection and welfare levels, this paper demonstrates that comparing to social planner, the oligopolists' products are of too low a quality and result in lower welfare levels. The inefficient quality selection and welfare levels entail the breaking up oligopoly and introducing competition in China telecommunications industry.
出处
《首都经济贸易大学学报》
2003年第5期72-74,共3页
Journal of Capital University of Economics and Business
基金
国家社科基金项目<博弈论应用与经济动态模型研究>阶段成果之一
