摘要
本文以沪深交易所1 778家民营上市公司和1 901家国有上市公司为研究对象,考察了2007—2010年高管股权激励差距对企业价值的影响,藉此评价了经理持股离散度对高管股权激励结构的优化功能。实证研究发现:相对于国有企业,民营企业高管股权激励差距(高管持股离散度)对企业价值具有更为显著的积极效应,而锦标赛理论能够更好地诠释这种差距对上市公司价值的影响效应。高管股权激励差距的扩大所产生的管理团队竞争效应有利于促使企业高管做出更多努力,减少企业代理成本,并提升企业价值。
This paper studies the impact of top management stock incentive difference on firm value based on SHSE-listed cross-section corporate data from2007 to 2010 and evaluates incentive effect of top management shareholding divergence. Our empirical result shows that while top management stockholding divergence has significant positive effect on firm value in private-owned enterprises,top management stockholding divergence has positive(but not stable)effect on firm value in state-owned enterprises.The research suggests that the tournament theory has stronger explanatory power about positive effect of top management shareholding difference on firm value.
出处
《上海商学院学报》
2014年第1期64-73,共10页
Business Economic Review
基金
广东自然科学基金项目(S2011040001810)
广东省软科学项目(2012B070300051)
关键词
高管股权激励差距
高管持股离散度
锦标赛理论
行为理论
management stock incentive difference,management shareholding divergence,the tournament theory,behavioral theory
