摘要
为了不断提升现代企业的价值,建立健全企业高管激励制度,解决代理人与股东之间代理利益与股东利益矛盾突出的问题,以我国上证市场2013-2015年的A股上市公司为样本,探究高管激励机制与企业价值之间的关系.结果表明,高管薪酬作为高管激励的重要方式,对提高企业价值有着显著的正向促进作用;高管股权激励对企业价值作用不显著.企业负债对高管激励及企业价值的影响过程中有显著逆向调节作用;企业规模对高管激励及企业价值的影响过程中有显著正向调节作用.
Abstract： The study aims to establish and improve the executive incentive system and settle the interest conflicts between agents and shareholders to enhance the value of modern enterprises. With A-share listed companies of Shanghai composite market from 2013 to 2015 as the samples, the relationship between managerial incentive mechanism and enterprise value is examined. Empirical results show that managerial pay, an important way of executive incentives, plays a positive role in enhancing enterprise value. However, there is no obvious correlation between executive shareholding level and enterprise value. The company liability has a significantly reverse moderating effect on the influence of executive compensation on enterprise value, while the company scale has a significanty positive moderating effect.
出处
《西安工业大学学报》
CAS
2017年第1期49-54,共6页
Journal of Xi’an Technological University
基金
安徽财经大学研究生科研创新基金(ACYC2015162)
关键词
高管激励
企业价值
企业负债
企业规模
executive incentive
enterprise value
enterprise liability
enterprise firm size
