摘要
塞尔指出语言的指称依赖于心灵的指称,提出指称是在主要和次要方面共同作用下实施的言语行为,认为限定性摹状词普遍被用作指称,不同意唐纳兰提出的指称性和归属性用法区分。笔者认为塞尔意向性指称论中的指称概念本身存在较大的语义模糊性,有必要根据指称概念的使用语境区分其意义,并将存在原则的适用范围扩大至非存对象。最后,笔者提出塞尔的主次要方面交互作用分类从侧面表明唐纳兰指称性和归属性区分的合理性。
Searle argued that reference in language is dependent on reference in mind.He maintained that reference is a speech actperformed under both primary and secondary aspect.Disapproving of Donellan’s distinction between the attributive and referentialuses of definite descriptions,Searle held that definite descriptions are generally used for referential purposes.This paper presentsa comprehensive and in-depth review of Searle’s intentional referential theory and proposes that semantic ambiguity in the notion ofreference per se needs to be clarified for a better understanding of the theory.Moreover,it is argued that the principle of exis-tence is equally applicable to non-existent beings,and the interaction between primary and secondary aspect of reference serves asa proof for the reasonableness in Donellan’s distinction of the two uses of definite descriptions.
作者
刘秋芬
杨滢滢
Liu Qiu-fen;Yang Ying-ying(University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China;Shanghai International Studies University,Shanghai 200083,China)
出处
《外语学刊》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第5期7-11,共5页
Foreign Language Research
基金
教育部人文社科研究项目“学习者致使构式习得发展模式及认知建构研究”（16YJC740080）
上海理工大学外语学院2019年度教研科研培育项目“英语专业大学生学习满意度现状、影响因素及提升策略研究”（WYJYPY004）的阶段性成果
关键词
限定性摹状词
指称
存在原则
主要方面
次要方面
definite description
reference
existence
primary aspect
secondary aspect
