摘要
解决公司所有者与经营者 (CEO)之间的代理问题的董事会机制包括CEO监督机制和激励机制。一方面这些监督激励变量对公司绩效有着直接的影响 ;另一方面这些变量之间又是相互作用、相互影响、相互替代的。企业应根据企业自身的特点尤其是CEO的个人品性来设计出CEO监督激励组合 。
There are two categories of governance mechanisms that the firm can employ in order to align the interests of CEO with the interests of owners: organization monitoring mechanisms and CEO incentive alignment mechanisms. One hand, these mechanisms directly effect on the organizational outcomes; on the other hand ,they are not independent of each other. The corporate should design governance package according to corporate situation to ensure the firm to get better performance.
出处
《财经理论与实践》
CSSCI
北大核心
2003年第2期87-91,共5页
The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics
关键词
公司治理
CEO
监督机制
激励机制
公司绩效
Corporate governance
CEO
monitoring-incentive alignment mechanisms
corporate performance.