摘要
高管是企业的决策主体,其行为特征深刻影响着企业的战略发展。本文以董事长为核心,研究高管任期交错与企业创新投入的关系。结果显示,董事长与CEO、董事长与CFO任期交错会显著降低企业的创新投入水平,并且这一效应不受董事长早于或晚于CEO(CFO)任职的影响。当区分产权性质进一步研究时,本文发现,相对于非国有企业而言,国有企业董事长和CEO任期交错对企业创新投入的抑制效果更显著,但国有企业董事长和CFO任期交错对企业创新投入的抑制效果与非国有企业没有显著差别。本文的研究丰富了高管异质性的相关理论,并对上市公司提高创新投入水平具有一定的启示意义。
The executive is the decision-making body of the enterprise,and its behavior characteristics have a profound influence on the enterprise strategic development.Taking the chairman as the research core,this paper studies the relationship between the staggered executive tenure and enterprise innovation investment.The results show that the staggered tenure of chairman and CEO or chairman and CFO significantly reduce the level of enterprise innovation investment,and this effect are not affected by the chairman’s earlier appointment than CEO’s(CFO’s)or later appointment than CEO’s(CFO’s).When distinguishing the property rights to further study,this paper finds that compared with non-state firms,the negative influence of staggered tenure of state-owned firms’chairman and CEO on enterprise innovation investment is more significant,and the negative influence of staggered tenure of chairman and CFO on enterprise innovation investment is not significant between different enterprise ownership.The research of this paper enriches the theories of heterogeneity of executives,and has some enlightenment to improve the enterprise innovation investment.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第12期56-61,共6页
Accounting Research
关键词
任期交错
企业创新投入
产权性质
Staggered Tenure
Enterprise Innovation Investment
Enterprise Ownership
