摘要
高管市场化选聘与激励能否改进经营绩效是国企改革中亟待回答的问题。本文以2004-2015年我国A股国有上市公司为样本,检验股权激励对国有企业市场化选聘的"市场高管"与上级组织任命或委派的"行政高管"现金持有行为的不同影响。结果发现:股权激励对上市国有企业高管具有显著的激励作用,股权激励强度越高,高管的现金持有水平越趋向于目标现金持有水平;与"行政高管"相比,对"市场高管"实行股权激励并未在现金持有方面取得更好的激励效果。进一步分析显示"八项规定"颁布和高融资约束是导致"市场高管"股权激励效果相对较弱的主要原因;在投资机会较少的企业中,"市场高管"股权激励发挥了显著的作用。
Whether the market-based selection and incentive of executives can improve business performance is a question to be answered in the reform of state-owned enterprises.This paper explores the different effects of equity incentive on cash holding behavior of market-based selection“administrative executives”and“market-oriented executives”in SOEs.Results show that equity incentive has a significantly positive effect on listed state-owned enterprise executives,the higher the intensity of equity incentive,the more cash holding level of executives will be towards the level of target cash holdings;equity incentive for“market-oriented executives”does not get better results compared with equity incentive for“administrative executives”.Further research shows that the“Eight Rules”of the CPC Central Committee and high financing constraints lead to the relatively weak incentive effect of“market-oriented executives”;in the enterprises with less investment opportunities,“market-oriented executives”with equity incentive perform better than“administrative executives”.
作者
杨志强
胡小璐
YANG Zhi-qiang;HU Xiao-lu(Accounting College,Guangdong University of Finance&Economics,Guangzhou 510320,China)
出处
《商业研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第11期108-118,共11页
Commercial Research
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目
项目编号:71502041
广东省高等学校优秀青年教师培养计划项目
项目编号:YQ2015079
中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目
项目编号:2017950637
广东大学生科技创新培育专项资金重点资助项目
项目编号:pdjh2018a0201
关键词
混合所有制
行政高管
市场高管
股权激励
现金持有
mixed ownership
administrative executives
market-oriented executives
equity incentives
cash holdings
