摘要
标准必要专利权人仅针对终端产品制造商发放许可,不太可能损害通信模组供应市场上的竞争、阻碍新型通信模组的研发上市,一般不会产生使通信模组供应商遭受利润挤压,以扭曲FRAND许可费谈判过程的方式损害终端产品制造市场上的创新的后果。多个专利权人通过专利联营实施终端环节许可行为不会在下游市场产生协同效应。与此同时,权利人在终端环节许可能以最小的交易成本获得与专利对产品的增量贡献相称的回报,具有似真的促进创新效率的商业正当化理由。因此我国反垄断执法机构应在掌握充分的事实证据,在初步证明标准必要专利权人的终端环节许可行为与实际发生的消费者福利减损之间具有因果关系的情况下,才开启反垄断程序进行审理调查。
It is unlikely that holders of standard-enssential patent(SEPs)license their SEPs only to end-product manufacturers can harm competition in downstream markets.Specifically,the component makers would not be prevented from designing new types of communication modules.The component makers would not suffer from profit squeeze.The end-product makers would not be forced to pay higher amount of royalties.Licensing SEPs via a patent pool does not eliminate competition among the pool members and result in higher royalty rates.Meanwhile,SEP holders may obtain a return on investment commensurate with the SEPs’incremental value with minimal transaction costs.That is,the end-product level licensing is prima facie justified by valid business purposes.Therefore,Chinese antitrust agencies and courts should start anti-monopoly proceedings only when factual evidence demonstrates a causal link between the SEP holder's end-product level licensing and consumer detriment.
出处
《竞争政策研究》
CSSCI
2024年第5期90-102,共13页
Competition Policy Research
关键词
标准必要专利
终端环节许可行为
反垄断法
Standard-Essential Patents
End-Product Level Licensing
Anti-Monopoly Law
