摘要
探究绿色金融政策的作用机理及政策效果具有重要理论意义与实践价值。基于不完全信息动态博弈理论,揭示绿色金融政策背景下高耗能高污染企业策略性行为与融资活动的关系:绿色金融政策会引发企业“信号战争”与绿色创新行为,进而形成多种纳什均衡,对“两高”企业融资产生不同影响。基于537家上市公司相关数据,采用链式中介效应模型考察绿色金融政策对“两高”企业融资成本的影响,结果发现:绿色金融政策不仅能够直接降低“两高”企业融资成本,而且可以通过环境信息披露、绿色技术创新的中介作用,以及环境信息披露和绿色技术创新的链式中介作用3条间接路径降低企业融资成本。
Since the signing of the Paris Agreement,global climate governance has entered a new stage,and some governments have been actively deepening international cooperation to promote global green and sustainable development.Green finance is a new financial model that combines environmental protection with economic profits,playing a significant role in environmental governance.In this context,green finance policies have greater impacts on the financial costs of high-pollution and high-energy-consumption enterprises with two mechanisms of action;on the one hand,green finance policies directly raise the financial threshold for high-energy-consumption and high-pollution enterprises,increasing their debt financing costs;on the other hand,these enterprises can establish good social images through green technology innovation and green information disclosure,which not only helps to gain the favor of investors but also obtain green financial policy support,and to some extent alleviates their costs of debt financing.The purpose of this study is to explore the mechanism and effectiveness of green finance policies,for it would be conducive to improving China's green finance policy system and guiding the green transformation and upgrading of high-energy-consumption and high-pollution enterprises,thus providing important theoretical and practical significance for China's green transformation.The current research on green finance policies has some inadequacies.Firstly,the existing literature assumes that green finance policies increase the difficulty of financing for high-energy-consumption and high-pollution enterprises,thus increasing their total financial costs.In fact,this confuses the total quantity effect and cost effect.Secondly,the existing research ignores the strategic behavior of high-energy-consumption and high-pollution enterprises.Enterprises can take"signaling warfare"to deal with the impact of adverse policies on their financing costs,such as reducing their external financing costs by creating adverse selection throu
作者
蒙大斌
李新宇
李磊
Meng Dabin;Li Xinyu;Li Lei(School of Economics,Tianjin University of Commerce,Tianjin 300134,China;Nankai Institute of International Economics,Tianjin 300134,China)
出处
《科技进步与对策》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第18期23-32,共10页
Science & Technology Progress and Policy
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目(22&ZD097)。
关键词
绿色金融政策
信号博弈
环境信息披露
绿色技术创新
Green Financial Policy
Signaling Game
Environmental Information Disclosure
Green Technology Innovation
