摘要
随着专家学者的不断研究与探索,企业创新能力评价体系逐渐成熟,并且成为创新型企业获取银行贷款的重要参照指标。将企业R&D投入分为内源融资和外源融资,并引入商业信贷作为银行信贷的替代信用,分别探讨了在外源性R&D投入存在和不存在两种情况下,企业创新能力评价体系能否使银行贷款和企业创新策略选择达到最优。研究发现:当不存在外源性R&D投入时,银行能够在其收益最大化的同时为企业提供其创新策略选择最优贷款额;考虑企业外源性R&D投入时,创新能力评价体系不能使银企效用同时达到最大。因此,银行在对企业贷款中所依赖的创新能力评价体系是导致银行贷款对企业创新投资促进作用不显著的重要原因。
With the study and exploration of the experts and scholars,enterprise innovation ability evaluation system ma-tures and becomes an important reference index of small and medium technology enterprises to obtain bank loans.Through the corporate R&D investment into internal financing and external financing,and the introduction of commercial credit as a substitute for bank credit facilities,respectively,discussed if the existence of exogenous R&D investment in both cases, the enterprises'innovation ability evaluation system is able to make bank loans and corporate innovation strategy to achieve optimal choice.The study found:When there is no exogenous R&D investment,the bank can offer its innovative corporate decision to select the optimal loan amount while in maximizing its revenue;considerations when enterprises endogenous R&D investment exist,innovation ability evaluation system cannot make silver while achieving optimal utility enterprises. Therefore,the bank loans to enterprises rely on innovation ability evaluation system is a major cause of bank loans to busi-ness innovation investment promotion not significant.
出处
《科技进步与对策》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第16期136-140,共5页
Science & Technology Progress and Policy
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70871056
71271103)
江苏省"六大人才高峰"项目(2010-JY-003)
关键词
银行信贷
创新能力评价
外源性
R&D
投入
动态博弈
Bank Credit
Innovation Capacity Evaluation
Exogenous R&D Investment
Dynamic Game
