摘要
为了破解短视频市场的监管困局,构建行而有效的短视频平台监管机制,基于演化博弈理论,分别构建了政府静态惩罚机制和分级惩罚机制下短视频平台和用户的演化博弈模型,分析了双方行为决策的动态演化路径和相互作用机理。研究表明:静态惩罚机制下,当政府惩罚力度或平台声誉损失逐渐增加时,短视频平台倾向于选择“严格监管”策略,但随着监管成本与流失用户成本的增加,短视频平台继而转向选择“消极监管”策略。用户的策略选择取决于平台惩罚和政府惩罚,当且仅当平台惩罚与政府惩罚均较大时,用户才会选择“合规”策略。分级惩罚机制下,增大一级惩罚与二级惩罚的力度,也将使平台选择“严格监管”策略。分级惩罚机制下短视频平台严格监管的概率随着用户合规概率的升高而降低,而静态惩罚机制与之相反。更为重要的是,相比于静态惩罚机制,分级惩罚机制下短视频平台总是会选择“严格监管”策略。
In order to solve the regulatory dilemma of the short-video market and build an effective regulatory mechanism for short-video platforms,this study constructs an evolutionary game model for short-video platforms and users under the government's static punishment mechanism and graded punishment mechanism respectively based on evolutionary game theory,and analyzes the dynamic evolutionary path and interaction mechanism of their behavioral decisions.The research shows that under the static punishment mechanism,short video platforms tend to choose the strategy of“strict regulation”when the government punishment or the loss of platform reputation gradually increases,but as the cost of regulation and the cost of users increases,short video platforms then turn to choose the strategy of"negative regulation".However,as the cost of regulation and the cost to lost users increases,short video platforms then move to a"negative regulation"strategy.Users'strategy choice depends on both platform penalties and government penalties,with users choosing a"compliance"strategy when and only when both platform penalties and government penalties are higher.Under a graded penalty mechanism,increasing the strength of primary and secondary penalties will also lead platforms to choose a"strict regulation"strategy.The probability of strict regulation on short-video platforms decreases as the probability of user compliance increases under a graded penalty mechanism,as opposed to a static penalty mechanism.More importantly,short-video platforms will always choose a"strict regulation"strategy under a graded penalty mechanism as opposed to a static penalty mechanism.
作者
巩永华
何光强
GONG Yonghua;HE Guangqiang(School of Management,Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications,Nanjing 210003,China;Information Industry Integration Innovation and Emergency Management Research Center,Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications,Nanjing 210003,China)
出处
《科学与管理》
2024年第4期76-85,共10页
Science and Management
基金
教育部人文社科项目青年项目(20YJC630008)
南京邮电大学自然科学基金项目(NY220044)。
关键词
短视频
平台监管
分级惩罚机制
演化博弈
short video
platform supervision
hierarchical punishment mechanism
evolutionary game
