摘要
基于2003-2022年A股上市公司数据,以《反垄断法》实施为准自然实验,运用双重差分模型考察竞争政策对企业劳动收入份额的影响效应及作用机制。结果发现,《反垄断法》对企业劳动收入份额具有显著正向影响。机制检验表明,《反垄断法》通过提高普通职工平均工资、扩大劳动雇佣规模和抑制有偏技术进步,进而提升企业劳动收入份额。异质性分析发现,《反垄断法》对于市场化程度较低地区、劳动资本密集型行业和国有企业的劳动收入份额的提升效应更为显著。
Based on the data of A-share listed firms from 20032022,this paper uses the Antimonopoly Law as a quasi-natural experiment to evaluate the impact of competition policy on firms'labor income share.The study finds that the Antim-onopoly Law significantly raises the labor income share of firms.Mechanism tests show that the Antimonopoly Law raises la-bor income share by raising the average wage of general workers,expanding the scale of labor employment,and inhibiting biased technological progress.Heterogeneity analysis finds that the Antimonopoly Law has a more significant effect on the la-bor income share of less market-oriented regions,labor-capital-intensive industries,and state-owned enterprises.
作者
李旭东
郑明波
张森
LI Xu-dong;ZHENG Ming-bo;ZHANG Sen(School of Economics and Finance,Xi'an Jiaotong University,Xi'an 710061;School of Economics and Management,Chang'an University,Xi'an 710064)
出处
《软科学》
北大核心
2024年第5期126-131,共6页
Soft Science
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(21BJY004)
国家自然科学基金项目(72074176)。
关键词
竞争政策
反垄断
劳动收入份额
收入分配
共同富裕
competition policy
antimonopoly
labor income share
income distribution
common wealth
