摘要
近年来,美国国内贸易保护主义泛起、霸权焦虑蔓延,加之美国逐渐失去WTO规则主导权,美国开始限制对WTO授权。对此,文章基于委托-代理理论具体分析美国对WTO自主性的控制机制,认为美国通过协商一致下的否决权影响WTO的人事任免、预算等重要事项,从而实现对WTO的控制。鉴于协商一致决策制仍最可能为各方接受的决策机制,对其实施改革的可能性微乎其微,文章建议可从加强代理人内部职能、优化谈判机制、寻求替代性方案三方面着手推动WTO走出决策困境。
In recent years,due to the emergence of domestic trade protectionism and the spread of hegemonic anxiety in the United States,coupled with its gradual loss of dominance of WTO rules,the United States has begun to restrict its authorization to WTO.In this regard,this paper analyzes the control mechanism of the United States over WTO autonomy based on principal-agent theory,and it is found that the United States affects the important matters of WTO such as personnel appointments and budgets through its veto power under consensus,thereby achieving its control over WTO.Given that the decision-making mechanism based on consensus is still the most likely decision-making mechanism to be accepted by all parties and the possibility of implementing reforms on it is extremely small,this paper suggests that efforts should be made to strengthen the internal functions of agents,optimize negotiation mechanisms and seek alternative solutions to help WTO overcome the decision-making difficulties.
作者
刘作珍
袁泉
LIU Zuozhen;YUAN Quan
出处
《国际经贸探索》
北大核心
2024年第4期102-114,共13页
International Economics and Trade Research
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(20BFX205)。
