摘要
传统国际贸易理论对于国家间博弈过程中保持、扩大自身相对实力的权力追求缺乏考量。而在大国博弈背景下,权力在先发国家与后发国家间贸易中的重要性则更加凸显。基于此,在经典的两国贸易理论中引入权力要素,将经济学注重的绝对福利和政治学注重的相对福利视作行为体的双重目标,运用博弈论方法,可以为大国博弈建立一个简洁、方便、贴近现实、适用广泛的国际经济政治学分析框架。由此可以发现,在一个由先发国家和后发国家组成的两国博弈中,后发国家更加偏好“扬已长补己短”战略;先发国家更加偏好于“压彼短扬彼长”战略,而一旦决定比较优势的技术差距由大变小,先发国家则更倾向于全面打压后发国家甚至“脱钩”。
The traditional theories of international trade fail to consider the pursuit of power aimed at maintaining and expanding countries'relative strength in inter-country competition.In the context of great power gaming,the importance of power in the trade between first-mover and late-mover countries is even more striking.On this basis,a concise,convenient,realistic and widely applicable analytical framework for great power gaming from the perspective of international political economy can be established by introducing the power element into the classical theory of trade between two countries,taking absolute economic welfare and relative political welfare as the dual goals of the actors and using game theory methodology.It will be seen that in a two-country game composed of first-mover and late-mover countries,the latter prefer the strategy of"promoting their strengths and compensating for their weaknesses,"but the former prefer"coming down hard on the other side's weaknesses while promoting one's strengths."Once the technological gap that determines comparative advantage dwindles,first-mover countries are more inclined to come down hard on late-mover countries in every wayor even decouple from them.
作者
张宇燕
夏广涛
Zhang Yuyan;Xia Guangtao
出处
《中国社会科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第2期26-46,204,205,共23页
Social Sciences in China
