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观察机制对囚徒困境博弈合作水平的影响

Impact of observation mechanism on cooperation level in prisoner’s dilemma game
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摘要 在演化博弈论中,合作有利于增加群体收益.目前,大量的研究工作都在关注合作水平的提高,但忽视了理论与实际的相关性,同时策略更新时间仅限于一个点上的收益.为此,引入完全同步、相对同步、高斯异步、指数异步4种观察机制模型,考虑智能体观察期内所获得的平均收益.随后,采用蒙特卡洛方法进行实验仿真,并分析各观察机制对囚徒困境博弈合作水平的影响.结果表明:在4种模型中都存在观察时间阈值,此时合作水平将达到峰值;最高合作水平在指数异步模型中实现;高斯异步模型中,合作水平与方差成正相关;智能体间的异质性也对合作产生积极影响.这项研究有助于打破传统研究收益的局限,促进合作水平的提高.仿真实验结果为支持社会群体合作提供了一定的理论依据. In evolutionary game theory,cooperation is beneficial to increasing collective revenues.Presently,although the cooperation level has been raised in abundant studies,the correlation between theory and practice is ignored,while the update time of the strategy is restricted to one point of earnings.Therefore,we introduce an observation mechanism to investigate the average return of the agent during the observation period,including four observation models:complete synchronization,relative synchronization,Gaussian asynchronization and exponential asynchronization.Subsequently,we employ the Monte Carlo method for the experimental simulation and analyze its effect on the cooperation level of prisoner's dilemma game.The results suggest that there is a time-observing threshold in every model and the cooperation level is optimum at the moment;the highest level of cooperation is realized in the exponential asynchronous model;the cooperation level in the Gaussian asynchronous model is positively correlated with the square deviation.Meanwhile,the heterogeneity between different agents also produces a positive influence on the cooperation.This work is conducive to eradicating the limitations of benefits in traditional research and promoting the improvement of the cooperation level.Some theoretical basis are provided for supporting social group cooperation.
作者 蒋贤惠 蒋玉莲 黄勤珍 JIANG Xian-hui;JIANG Yu-lian;HUANG Qin-zhen(College of Electrical Engineering,Southwest Minzu University,Chengdu 610041,China;Key Laboratory of Electronic Information of State Ethnic Affairs Commission,Southwest Minzu University,Chengdu 610041,China)
出处 《控制与决策》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2024年第1期311-318,共8页 Control and Decision
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(62073270) 国家民委创新团队、2021中央高校省部级共建平台专项基金项目(2021NYYXS115) 四川省教育厅创新团队项目(15TD0050) 西南民族大学2021研究生创新型科研项目(CX2021SZ36)。
关键词 观察机制 囚徒困境博弈 异质性 合作水平 平均收益 蒙特卡洛方法 observation mechanism prisoner's dilemma game heterogeneity cooperation level average income Monte Carlomethod
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