摘要
选取我国沪深两市2007年-2021年上市公司样本,在使用PSM+DID有效控制机构选股偏好引致的内生性前提下,检验了机构持股、机构持股结构对公司高管薪酬的影响。结论表明:机构投资者持股确实能够显著抑制高管薪酬操纵并提升上市公司高管薪酬-业绩敏感性,但这一作用需要机构持股相对集中才能实现,机构持股集中度成为机构投资者影响高管薪酬的调节变量。同时机构持股对高管业绩-薪酬敏感性的影响存在非对称性,在公司业绩下滑区间薪酬影响更为强烈。此外,机构持股的薪酬影响实现,主要是通过管理层限权而实现,在高管理层权力样本组中,机构持股对高管薪酬的影响被大大削弱。
Select the samples of Listed Companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2019,and empirically tests the impact of institutional ownership and institutional ownership structure on executive compensation under the premise of using PSM+did to effectively control the endogenous caused by institutional stock selection preference.The conclusion shows that institutional investors’shareholding can significantly inhibit executive compensation manipulation and improve the executive compensation performance sensitivity of listed companies,but this effect can only be realized by the relative concentration of institutional shareholding.The concentration of institutional shareholding has become a regulatory variable for institutional investors to affect executive compensation.At the same time,the impact of institutional ownership on executive performance compensation sensitivity is asymmetric,and the impact on compensation is stronger in the range of company performance decline.In addition,the impact of institutional ownership on executive compensation is mainly realized through management power restriction.In the sample group of senior management power,the impact of institutional ownership on executive compensation is greatly weakened.
作者
刘伟东
佘溪水
LIU Wei-dong;SHE Xi-shui
出处
《科学决策》
2023年第11期140-155,共16页
Scientific Decision Making
关键词
高管薪酬
薪酬-业绩敏感性
机构投资者持股结构
executive compensation
pay performance sensitivity
shareholding structure of institutional investors
