摘要
以中国沪港通与深港通交易制度的实施为政策背景,采用多时点双重差分模型,考察了资本市场开放对标的公司的高管薪酬契约有效性的影响。研究发现:沪深港通交易制度的实施显著提高了标的公司的高管薪酬契约有效性,具体表现为高管业绩-薪酬敏感性提升。机制检验表明:沪深港通改善了标的公司的信息环境并增加了其股价信息含量,从而改善了标的公司的高管薪酬契约有效性。进一步研究发现:深港通交易制度的治理作用存在持续增强的时间效应;沪深港通交易制度还提高了标的公司的高管非运气业绩-高管薪酬敏感性,并降低了高管薪酬黏性。
In the policy context of the implementation of the trading system of“Shanghai-Hong Kong”and“Shenzhen-Hong Kong”Stock Connects,this paper employs a multi-time point difference-in-difference model to examine the impact of capital market opening on the effectiveness of the target company’s executive compensation contracts.The findings show that the implementation of the trading system of“Shanghai-Hong Kong”and“Shenzhen-Hong Kong”Stock Connects has significantly improved the effectiveness of the target company’s executive compensation contracts,which is manifested in the improvement of the executive performance-compensation sensitivity.The result of the mechanism test shows that the“Shanghai-Hong Kong”and“Shenzhen-Hong Kong”Stock Connects have improved the effectiveness of the target company's executive compensation contracts by optimizing their information environment and increasing their information content of the stock prices.Further research also finds out that the governance effect of the trading system of“Shanghai-Hong Kong”and“Shenzhen-Hong Kong”Stock Connects has a continuously enhanced time effect.The trading system of the“Shanghai-Hong Kong”and“Shenzhen-Hong Kong”Stock Connects has also improved the non-lucky performance-compensation sensitivity of the target company's executives,hence reducing the stickiness of the executive compensation.
作者
孙泽宇
齐保垒
SUN Ze-yu;QI Bao-lei(Xi’an Jiaotong University,Xi’an 710049,China)
出处
《当代财经》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第1期124-136,共13页
Contemporary Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目“签字注册会计师社会资本与审计行为研究:理论分析与经验证据”(71502134)。
关键词
沪深港通交易制度
业绩-薪酬敏感性
非运气业绩
薪酬黏性
trading system of“Shanghai-Hong Kong”and“Shenzhen-Hong Kong”Stock Connect
performance-compensation sensitivity
non-luck performance
compensation stickiness
