摘要
基于协同理论和代理理论,利用我国A股上市公司2015年-2021年数据,构建Probit和logit模型实证检验管理层所有权与企业并购决策的关系。研究发现,管理层所有权增加了企业实施并购活动的可能性;进一步分析企业实施并购活动的经济后果,发现管理层所有权并没有协调股东与管理者的利益,在管理层所有权驱动下实施的并购活动虽然能在短期内提高会计业绩,但却并不能提高企业价值,管理层所有权作为高管股权报酬的一种形式并不能消除代理问题。因此,签订的薪酬合同应提高管理层薪酬与其业绩之间的关联度,保持合理的薪酬结构,要能激励管理层为增加股东财富而经营,防止其实施有损企业价值的并购活动。
Based on the synergy theory and agency theory,using the data of China's A-share listed companies from 2015-2021,this paper constructs Probit and Logit models to empirically examine the relationship between managerial ownership and corporate M&A decisions.It is found that managerial ownership increases the likelihood of enterprises performing M&A activities.To further analyze the economic consequences of enterprises performing M&A activities,it is found that managerial ownership does not align the interests of shareholders and managers,and M&A activities performed under the driver of managerial ownership do not increase the enterprise value although they improve the accounting performance in the short term.Thus,managerial ownership as an executive equity compensation form does not eliminate agency problems.Consequently,compensation contracts should improve the correlation between managerial compensation and its performance,maintain a reasonable compensation structure,and provide incentives for management to operate for the purpose of increasing shareholder wealth,and prevent them from engaging in mergers and acquisitions that are detrimental to the enterprise value.
作者
杨露
杨奇
YANG Lu;YANG Qi(School of Economics and Management,Guangzhou City Construction College,Guangzhou 510900;Finance Department,Zhoukou Normal College,Zhoukou 466000)
出处
《财务与金融》
2023年第4期8-15,共8页
Accounting and Finance
关键词
协同理论
代理理论
管理层所有权
并购活动
会计业绩
企业价值
Synergy Theory
Agency Theory
Managerial Ownership
Merger and Acquisition Activities
Accounting Performance
Enterprise Value
