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信用评级的融资与监督效应——来自企业并购的证据 被引量:15

The Financing and Supervisory Effects of Credit Rating: Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions
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摘要 本文以2008—2017年中国A股上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了信用评级对企业并购决策的影响和作用机理。研究发现:首先,相比没有评级的企业,有评级的企业更倾向于对外并购且并购规模更大,证实信用评级通过缓解企业融资约束促进了企业并购;其次,为了维持高评级、避免不当并购可能导致评级下降,高评级企业的并购决策更谨慎,说明信用评级在企业并购过程中发挥了监督作用。一系列稳健性检验后,研究结论仍然成立。进一步研究表明,当评级下降后,为了避免评级进一步恶化,企业会减少对外并购,该结果进一步支持了评级的监督作用。本文首次从融资和监督的角度研究中国信用评级对企业并购决策的影响,丰富了信用评级经济后果及并购行为影响因素的研究,为中国信用评级行业的长期稳定发展提供了理论指导依据。 As an infrastructure of bond market,credit rating plays an important role in capital market and firms’financial behaviors.Financing constraints theory suggests that credit rating can ease the financing constraints of enterprises,and then affect the financial behaviors of enterprises.Supervision theory states that credit rating reports issued by rating agencies can supervise the behaviors of enterprises to a certain extent,restraining their improper decisions.Our research provides empirical evidence for both the financing and supervisory effects of credit rating.We find that credit rating can promote mergers and acquisitions by alleviating financing constraints and restrain improper M&A by supervision effect.Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies over the period between 2008 and 2017,this paper empirically examines the effect and mechanism of credit rating on firms’M&A decisions.The empirical results show that:firstly,compared with non-rated enterprises,rated enterprises tend to make more acquisitions.And M&A scale is also much larger for rated enterprises than those non-rated enterprises,which is consistent with the relaxation of financial constraints;Secondly,in order to preserve their rating and avoid the possible rating decline caused by improper M&A,the M&A decision of high-rated enterprises is more cautious,which indicates that credit rating also plays a supervisory role in the M&A process.The results remain consistent after a series of robustness tests.Further research shows that,in order to avoid further deterioration of credit rating,enterprises will reduce M&A after their credit rating decline,which further supports the supervisory role of credit rating.This paper studies the impact of credit rating on M&A decisions from the perspective of financing and supervision effect,which enriches the research on the economic consequences of credit rating and the influencing factors of M&A behaviors,and provides a theoretical basis for the long-term and stable development of China’s credit rating
作者 翟玲玲 吴育辉 Zhai Lingling;Wu Yuhui(School of Accounting,Guangdong University of Finance and Economics;Institute of Capital Market and Audit Governance Studies for the Great Bay Area(Guangdong,Hong-Kong,Macao),GDUFE;School of Management,Xiamen University)
出处 《南开管理评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2021年第1期27-38,45-47,共15页 Nankai Business Review
基金 国家自然科学基金重大项目(71790601) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(20720171017) 广东省基础与应用基础研究基金联合基金项目(2020A1515110452)资助
关键词 信用评级 并购重组 融资约束 违约风险 Credit Rating M&A Financial Constraints Default Risk
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