摘要
行政包干制作为县域治理的核心机制,为诠释第一书记的驻村帮扶行动提供了有益的中观视角。基于农村脱贫减贫事业的有效治理和成本转嫁的考量,国家和地方政府以行政包干的方式推动第一书记驻村帮扶。在具体实践中,作为发包方的上级政府享有正式权威,但同时赋予了第一书记充分的自由裁量权和实际控制权,从而在权力配置上呈现“集权-分权”的悖论。拘囿于经济激励失灵和政治激励低效,驻村帮扶过程整体呈现出弱激励的弊态,这使得驻村帮扶的内部控制在注重结果管理的同时也显著强化了过程监控。此外,驻村帮扶集分并存、过程监控和自筹资源等特性,容易引发两委脱嵌与行政依赖、形式主义与造假共谋、发展失衡与短期效应等系统风险,亟需从厘清权责边界、革新督考机制、优化奖惩体系和均衡资源配置等方面予以政策优化。
As the core mechanism of county governance,the administrative contracting system provides a useful middle perspective for interpreting the first secretary's assistance in villages.In view of the quality pres-sureof poverty alleviation and the transfer of governance costs,the national and local govermments encourage the first secretary to be stationed in villages to provide assistance in the form of administrative assignment.In practical practice,as the employer,the superior government enjoys formal authority,but at the same time gives the first secretary full discretion and actual control power.Due to the failure ofeconomic incentives and the inefficiency of political incentives,the whole process of village-based assistance presents the disadvantage of weak incentives,which makes the internal control of village-based assistance pay attention to the result man-agement and significantly strengthen the process monitoring.In addition,the characteristics of village assis-tance collection and coexistence,process monitoring and self-financing resources can easily lead to the two committee separation and administrative dependence,formalism and fraud collusion,development imbalance and short-term effects and other systematic risks.It is urgent to reform the supervision mechanism,optimize the reward and punishment system and balanced resource allocation to optimize the policy.
作者
杜永康
张新文
DU Yongkang;ZHANG Xinwen
出处
《学习与实践》
北大核心
2023年第11期33-46,共14页
Study and Practice
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“社会质量视角下乡村治理与乡村振兴研究”(项目编号:18BGL171)。
关键词
行政包干制
第一书记
驻村帮扶
县域治理
Administrative contracting system
The first secretary
Village assistance
County governance
