摘要
在平台经济时代,自我优待是一类备受关注的潜在垄断行为。无论是在欧洲、美国,还是我国,都对应该如何应对这类行为存在着很大的争议。本文从法学和经济学的角度,对自我优待的性质、影响和应对进行了综合分析,并对一些相关的理论问题进行了探讨。本文认为,平台自我优待可能同时带来有害竞争和有利竞争的结果,因而“一刀切”式地用结构性拆分等方式将其禁绝并不合适。相比之下,采用一种管制和反垄断结合的思路,对不同的行为类别、不同的个案进行具体分析是一种更为合理的规制思路。
In the era of platform economy,self-preferencing is a potential monopolistic behavior that has received much attention.Whether in Europe,the United States,or China,there is great controversy over how to respond to such behavior.This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the nature,impact,and response of self-preferencing from the perspectives of law and economics,and explores some related theoretical issues.We believe that platform selfpreferencing may bring both harmful and favorable competition results,so it is not appropriate to ban it in a"one size fits all"manner using structural splitting and other methods.By contrast,adopting a combination of regulation and antitrust measures to conduct specific analysis of different types of behavior and individual cases is a more reasonable regulatory approach.
出处
《竞争政策研究》
2023年第5期5-24,共20页
Competition Policy Research
关键词
自我优待
平台
管制
反垄断
Self-preferencing
Platform
Regulation
Antitrust
