摘要
国家湿地公园生态保护补偿过程中生态保护者和受益者良性互动能够增强全社会参与生态保护的积极性,因此深入分析相关利益主体的诉求和效益分配十分重要。以旅游社区型国家湿地公园龙脊梯田为研究对象,引进生态-经济效益分配系数,利用演化博弈理论建立数学模型分析湿地公园内政府、企业和农民三方主体策略的演化趋势,再使用系统动力学(SD)模型进一步模拟仿真和深入分析,结果表明:1)政府、企业和农民实施策略概率的初始值不会影响策略的最终演进,但会影响演进过程的利益主体意愿程度变化。2)企业和农民的策略在一定条件下可以独立地影响政府的策略演进,且企业实施支持策略概率越高,政府实施参与策略也越高。3)农民响应政策付出的成本对企业的影响程度较大。4)企业给农民的补贴力度和各主体合作概率之间的关系是非线性的,并不是越大(小)就越好。5)农民的生态-经济效益分配系数为0.42,比企业略低。据此,完善了国家湿地公园生态保护补偿机制,从激励、约束、合作等方面提出了实现湿地公园生态可持续和区域高质量发展的政策建议。
The benign interaction between ecological protectors and beneficiaries in the compensation process for the ecological protection of national wetland parks can encourage the enthusiasm of the whole society to participate in ecological protection,so it is crucial to deeply analyze the appeals and benefit distribution among the relevant stakeholders.Taking the tourism community-type National Wetland Park of Longji Terrace as the research object,this paper introduces the ecological-economic benefit distribution coefficient and establishes a mathematical model that is based on evolutionary game theory to analyze the evolutionary trend of tripartite strategies of government,enterprises and farmers in the wetland park.The further simulation and in-depth analysis with the system dynamic model(SD) arrive at the following conclusions:1) the initial value of the probability that the government,enterprises and farmers implement the strategy will not affect the final evolution of the strategy,but change the willingness of the stakeholders in the evolution process.2) Under certain conditions,the strategies of enterprises and farmers can independently influence the evolution of the government's strategy,and the higher the probability that enterprises implement the support strategy,the higher probability of government's implementation of the participation strategy.3) The cost paid by farmers to respond to the policy has a greater impact on enterprises.4) The relationship between the subsidies provided by enterprises to farmers and the cooperation probability of various entities is nonlinear,and the larger(or smaller) is not the better.5) The distribution coefficient of farmers' ecological-economic benefits is 0.42,which is slightly lower than that of enterprises.Accordingly,the paper makes policy recommendations to improve the compensation mechanism for the ecological protection of national wetland parks,as well as to ecological sustainability and regional high-quality development of wetland parks through incentives,constraints,
作者
李一
郑文俊
LI Yi;ZHENG Wen-jun(School of Tourism and Landscape Architecture,Guilin University of Technology,Guilin 541006,China)
出处
《西安建筑科技大学学报（社会科学版）》
2023年第5期57-69,共13页
Journal of Xi'an University of Architecture & Technology(Social Science Edition)
关键词
国家湿地公园
生态保护机制
演化博弈
系统动力学
龙脊梯田
the National Wetland Park
ecological protection mechanism
evolutionary game
system dynamics
Longji Terrace
