摘要
文章在跨境电商海外仓模式背景下,探讨了一个跨境电商企业与两个进行数量竞争的跨境电商平台组成的二级供应链,面对有无信息泄露时的决策问题。考虑实际因素与供应链成员的自利性,跨境电商企业与领先平台、跟随平台分别签订收益共享契约、批发价格契约。文章构建了信息泄露和无信息泄露两种博弈模型,给出跨境电商平台在面对不同博弈时的订货策略。研究发现:跨境电商企业总是会为了自身利益选择泄露信息。当商品所需的单位信息成本较大时,领先平台在市场上的竞争力将会被削弱,获利能力不及跟随平台。
Under the background of cross-border e-commerce overseas warehouse mode,this paper discusses the decision-making problem of a secondary supply chain composed of a cross-border e-commerce enterprise and two cross-border e-commerce platforms with quantity competition in the face of information leakage.Considering the actual factors and the self-interest of supply chain members,cross-border e-commerce enterprises sign revenue sharing contracts and wholesale price contracts with leading platforms and following platforms respectively.This paper constructs two game models of information leakage and no information leakage,and gives the ordering strategy of cross-border e-commerce platform in the face of different games.The study found that cross-border e-commerce companies always choose to leak information for their own interests.When the unit information cost required for goods is large,the competitiveness of the leading platform in the market will be weakened,and the profitability will be inferior to the following platform.
作者
王旭
卢益清
WANG Xu;LU Yiqing(School of Information Management,Beijing Information Science and Technology University,Beijing 100192,China)
出处
《物流科技》
2023年第21期128-131,共4页
Logistics Sci-Tech
关键词
跨境电商供应链
海外仓
信息泄露
供应链契约
cross-border e-commerce supply chain
overseas warehouse
information leakage
supply chain contract
