摘要
在由一个研发型制造商、一个非研发型制造商和一个零售商构成的二级供应链中,研发型制造商向非研发型制造商进行技术授权并收取技术许可费,考虑研发结果的不确定性,研究了研发型制造商的最优技术授权策略选择(包括基于特许权收费、固定收费、混合收费等的技术授权策略),讨论了产品可替代性和技术溢出程度对最优收费值的影响,分别比较了有技术授权和无技术授权情形下研发型制造商的研发投入水平、非研发型制造商的批发价格和利润、零售商的利润等。研究表明:(1)研发型制造商的最优技术授权策略选择不受产品可替代性的影响,当技术溢出程度较小(大)时,其最优选择为基于混合收费(特许权收费)的技术授权策略。(2)特许权收费值和混合收费策略中的固定收费值同时受产品可替代性和技术溢出程度影响,而混合收费策略中的特许权收费值仅受产品可替代性影响。(3)当产品可替代性和技术溢出程度在一定范围内时,研发型制造商的技术授权可以提高零售商的利润。(4)技术授权情况下研发型制造商的研发投入水平总是大于无技术授权情况下。
For the innovative manufacturer,technology licensing is a practical approach to generate profits by the improved(or new)technology obtained from innovation.For the manufacturer with no(or weak)R&D abilities to engage in innovation,technology licensing is an effective way to acquire the new technology.In a two-echelon supply chain consisting of an R&D manufacturer,a non-R&D manufacturer and a retailer,the R&D manufacturer can license technology to the non-R&D manufacturer and charge technology authorization fees from the non-R&D manufacturer.Considering the uncertainty of R&D results,the optimal technology authorization strategy choice(including technology authorization based on royalty fee,fixed fee,mixed fee,and so on)of the R&D manufacturer is studied.Then,the effect of product substitution and technology spillover on the optimal charging fee are discussed.Finally,the optimal R&D levels of the R&D manufacturer,the whole price of non-R&D manufacturer,the profit of non-R&D manufacturer,the profit of retailer with and without the technology authorization are compared respectively.It is shown that:(1)the optimal technology authorization strategy choice of the R&D manufacturer is not affected by the product substitution,when the degree of technology spillover is small(large),the optimal choice of the R&D manufacturer is the authorization strategy based on mixed fees(royalty fee).(2)Both the charging fee in the royalty fee strategy and the fixed fee in the mixed fee strategy are affected by the product substitution and the technology spillover,while the royalty fee in the mixed fee strategy is only affected by the product substitution.(3)When the degrees of both the product substitution and the technology spillover are within a certain range,the profit of retailer can be improved by the technology authorization of the R&D manufacturer.(4)The R&D investment level of the R&D manufacturer with the technology authorization is always greater than that without the technology authorization.
作者
王伟
黄照旺
丁黎黎
张文思
WANG Wei;HUANG Zhao-wang;DING Li-li;ZHANG Wen-si(School of Economics,Ocean University of China,Qingdao 266100,China)
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2023年第7期266-275,共10页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71973132)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(18YJCZH247)
山东省哲学社会科学规划资助项目(18DGLJ01)。
