摘要
本文以一个制造商和一个资金约束零售商组成的需求信息不对称的双渠道供应链为研究对象,探讨了链上成员的信息共享和融资选择问题。基于Stackelberg博弈分别构建了信息共享/不共享及零售商选择贸易/银行信贷融资四种情境下链上各成员的收益模型,分析求解出各成员的最优决策变量和收益,并探讨了链上成员的信息共享和融资均衡策略。研究发现:当信息补贴成本位于某一区间时,双渠道供应链成员才会共享信息,该区间的上下界与零售商的融资选择相关;零售商的需求信息准确度适中时,此时共享信息能较好地缓解其资金约束程度;当市场需求可变部分的预期较低时,零售商应积极与制造商共享信息以引导制造商降低直销渠道的供货量;渠道竞争强度的提升可能会促使双渠道供应链成员共享信息。
This paper explores the information sharing and financing strategies in an information-asymmetric dual-channel supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one capital-constrained retailer.Based on whether the players share demand information and whether the capital-constrained retailer chooses trade credit financing or bank financing,we use the Stackelberg game to establish four different profit models.We derive the corresponding optimal order quantities and profits under different scenarios,and explore the equilibrium strategies for the dual-channel supply chain.We find that when the information subsidy cost is in a certain range,the players of the dualchannel supply chain will share the information,and the upper and lower boundaries of the range are related to the retailer’s financing choice.Moreover,when the accuracy of the retailer’s demand information is moderate,sharing information can alleviate the retailer’s capital constraint problem.In addition,when the expectation of the market demand is low,the retailer should actively share the information with the manufacturer in order to make the manufacturer reduce the direct channel’s order quantity.Furthermore,the increase of channel competition intensity may promote the players to share demand information in the dual-channel supply chain.
作者
张李浩
杨杰
Zhang Lihao;Yang Jie(Logistics Research Center,Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai 201306)
出处
《管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第5期280-291,共12页
Management Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71971137)
上海市“晨光计划”项目(20CG56)
上海市软科学研究项目(21692109300,22692110700)。
关键词
双渠道供应链
资金约束零售商
信息共享
融资选择
均衡策略
dual-channel supply chain
capital-constrained retailer
information sharing
financing choice
equilibrium strategies
