摘要
本文从高管个体社会关系网络视角,研究证券监管能否以及如何对内部人交易发挥威慑效应进而改善市场效率。研究发现,证券监管处罚不仅能够直接减少因违规交易被罚高管本人的内部人交易,而且还能够减少被罚高管的未违规亲属、同事等社会关系的内部人交易,并且上述威慑效应随着与被罚高管社会关系紧密程度的减弱而依次递减。异质性检验发现,上述威慑效应在违规处罚程度更严重、违规事项涉及内幕交易、违规高管涉及董事长或总经理时更显著。进一步研究发现,监管处罚不仅能够降低内部人交易的获利程度,而且能够在降低内部人交易的情况下减少买卖价差、降低股价同步性、缓解股价崩盘风险。上述结果表明,证券监管能够通过社会关系网络对内部人交易实现亲疏有别式的“惩一儆百”效果,进而改善资本市场运行效率。本文的研究对于完善证券监管、加强投资者保护、维护资本市场稳定具有重要启示。
Recently,there has been a lot of illegal trading by senior executives of listed companies.Insider trading cases have accounted for 51%of the total number of cases filed by the CSRC.Moreover,compared with insiders directly engaged in insider trading,multi-layer,multi-level and multi-directional insider trading is increasing day by day.Insider information has transmitted explosively through social networks,such as relatives and colleagues.The number of people involved and the value of illegal trading are also rising sharply.This has not only seriously damaged the legitimate interests of investors,but also severely disrupted the efficient function of the capital market,which attracts extensive attention from regulators,academia and the public.In order to deal with the capital market failure caused by the widely spread of illegal trading,securities regulation has become a common practice all over the world.Therefore,this paper studies whether and how securities regulation can exert the deterrent effect on insider trading to improve the market efficiency from the perspective of individual executives'social networks.This paper uses the data of transaction violation,social networks and stock trading of individual executives in A-share non-financial and unpunished listed companies from 2007 to 2018 to build a DID model for empirical research.It is found that securities regulatory penalties can not only reduce the insider trading of the punished executives,but also reduce the insider trading of their non-violating relatives and colleagues,and the above deterrent effect decreases with the weakening of the social relations with the punished executives.The heterogeneity test indicates that the above deterrent effect is more significant when punishment severity is higher,the illegal matter is insider dealing,and the illegal executive is the chairman or CEO.Further analyses show that regulatory penalties can not only reduce the profitability of insider trading,but also reduce bid-ask spread,stock price synchronicity and crash
作者
褚剑
Chu Jian(School of Business,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210093,China)
出处
《外国经济与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第4期23-37,69,共16页
Foreign Economics & Management
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71902085)。
关键词
证券监管
内部人交易
社会关系网络
惩一儆百
市场效率
securities regulation
insider trading
social networks
punish one to teach a hundred
market efficiency
