摘要
基于消费者对实际交货期与承诺交货期之间的感知差异,研究政府、消费者激励对再制造闭环供应链定价及送货渠道选择的影响问题.本文运用Stackelberg博弈理论,针对3种激励方式(无激励、政府激励、消费者激励)和2种送货渠道(制造商负责送货、零售商负责送货)的6种组合情景,构建6个供应链分散决策模型,并得到相应最优批发价格、销售价格、实际交货期、回收率、利润的解析公式.通过比较不同模型下的最优值和数值计算,研究发现:政府和消费者激励能提高回收率,缩短交货期,并且由零售商送货时,回收率更大,交货期更短.此外,消费者激励时,产品销售价格和批发价格会增大;从利润最大化的角度出发,由零售商还是制造商送货取决于消费者激励的强度.
Based on the consumers’perception gap between actual delivery time and promised delivery time,the problem of influence of government and consumer incentives on pricing and delivery channel selection of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain is studied.In this paper,Stackelberg game theory is used to construct 6 decentralized decision-making models of supply chain for 6 combination scenarios of three incentive modes:No incentive,the government incentive,the consumer incentive,and two delivery channels:The manufacturer responsible for delivery and the retailer responsible for delivery.Then the analytical formulas of optimal wholesale price,optimal sales price,optimal actual delivery time,optimal recovery rate and optimal profits are obtained.By comparing the optimal values under different models and using numerical calculations,it is found that the government and consumer incentives can improve the recovery rate,the delivery time is shortened.When the retailer delivers goods,the recovery rate is larger and the delivery time is shorter.In addition,when the consumer incentive exit,the selling price and wholesale price will increase.According to the profit maximization,whether the goods are delivered by the retailer or the manufacturer depends on the strength of the consumer’s incentive.
作者
李登峰
韦安鹏
LI Dengfeng;WEI Anpeng(School of Management and Economics,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 611731,China;School of Economics and Management,Guangxi University of Science and Technology,Liuzhou 545006,China)
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2023年第3期841-856,共16页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
国家自然科学基金(72271046,72071032)。
