摘要
文章考察大股东股权质押对上市公司在公开市场发布股份回购预案及其完成情况的影响。研究发现,在全样本中,存在大股东股权质押的上市公司发布回购预案的可能性更高;但在发布回购预案样本中,大股东股权质押对回购预案的实际完成情况没有显著影响。这说明,同时有正面因素和负面因素影响大股东股权质押与回购完成情况之间的关系,进而导致净效应不显著。异质性分析表明,在回购样本中,产权性质为国有时,由于声誉及监管效应等正面因素的影响,实际回购的完成情况会随着大股东股权质押压力的上升而显著变好;但当资产负债率较高、创新投入较大时,由于实力不足及财务状况不佳等负面因素的影响,实际回购的完成情况会随着大股东股权质押压力的上升而显著变差。经济后果检验表明,在股份回购与股权质押的双重影响下,回购预案仍然具有一定的市值管理效果;改善实际回购的完成情况有助于提升公司的未来业绩和财务指标。市场有关主体应该对大股东股权质押上市公司的回购行为保持必要的警醒,关注其在具体情境下可能存在的完成情况不理想等机会主义行为。
This paper investigates the influence of large shareholders’share pledge on the open market repurchase announcement and actual buyback in China’s listed firms.Based on the regression results by combing repurchase samples with non-repurchase samples,this paper finds listed firms with the large shareholders’share pledge are more likely to issue share repurchase plans.However,among listed firms issuing share repurchase plans,the relationship between large shareholders’share pledge and actual buyback is not significant due to the coexistence of positive and negative factors,which yields an insignificant net effect.Heterogeneity analysis finds that in repurchase samples,state-owned firms’actual buyback ratio increases as the pressure from large shareholder’s share pledge increases,due to considerations of reputation and regulatory effect.Firms with high leverage and high R&D expenditure have weak strength and face more financial constraints,then these firms’actual buyback ratio decreases as the pressure from large shareholder’s share pledge decreases.Empirical results of economic consequences show that under the influence of both large shareholders’share pledge and open market repurchase,open market repurchase announcement can still manage the market value,and improving actual buyback contributes to future performance and financial ratio.Relevant market entities should maintain the necessary vigilance against the share repurchase of listed firms with large shareholders’share pledge,and pay attention to the opportunistic behaviors such as low actual buyback under specific circumstances.
作者
辛宇
吴楚仪
顾小龙
Yu Xin;Chuyi Wu;Xiaolong Gu(School of Business,Sun Yat-sen University,Guangzhou Guangdong 510275,China;School of Accounting,Guangdong University of Finance&Economics,Guangzhou Guangdong 510320,China)
出处
《会计与经济研究》
北大核心
2023年第1期3-22,共20页
Accounting and Economics Research
基金
广东省自然科学基金项目(2021A1515012648)
国家自然科学基金重点项目(71790603)。
