摘要
控股股东股权质押已成为中国资本市场的金融常态,且这一趋势仍在上升。尽管股权质押能够较为便捷地获得金融贷款,但对控股股东而言还存在控制权转移的风险。本文以2003—2018年中国沪深A股公司为样本,研究在股权质押情境下,控股股东是否存在策略性的慈善捐赠行为,以降低控制权转移风险。结果表明,当控股股东进行股权质押后,企业的慈善捐赠水平会显著增加,且上述结论存在较强稳健性。对捐赠动机的检验发现,控股股东在股权质押情境下的慈善捐赠行为同时表现为拉抬股价和寻租动机:一方面,当股票市场的走势趋于熊市和公司股价更接近出质股权的平仓警戒线时,控股股东在股权质押情境下的慈善捐赠动机会更加强烈;另一方面,在非国有控股企业和无政治关联的企业中,控股股东股权质押对企业慈善捐赠的正向影响更为明显。进一步研究发现,当企业应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理程度更低时,控股股东在股权质押情境下慈善捐赠动机会相对增强,说明在股权质押的情境下,控股股东会权衡不同市值管理行为的成本收益关系,慈善捐赠更多是其他行为受限时的策略性行为。本文的研究结论进一步揭示了控股股东在股权质押情境下的策略性行为,对于监管机构和投资者理解企业慈善捐赠的行为动机也具有重要启示意义。
The controlling shareholder’s shares pledge has become a financial normal in Chinese capital market,and it is still spreading.Although shareholders can conveniently obtain loans from bank by pledging their shares,there is still a risk of losing control rights.With the 2003—2018 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as samples,this paper investigates whether controlling shareholders would carry out strategic charitable donation under the situation of pledging shares,due to the risk of losing control rights.The main results show that the level of corporate charitable donation will increase significantly after controlling shareholders pledged their shares.The analysis for motivation show that the impact is more pronounced when stock market is being bear market,the stock price is closer to the alarm line of liquidating positions,firms with non-stated control rights and firms without political connection,which indicate that the corporate charitable donation behavior,under the situation of controlling shareholders pledging shares,has both stock price and political rent motivation.Further study find that the motivation of charitable donations is significantly increased in firms with lower degree of accrual and real earnings management,which means that controlling shareholders would weigh the cost-benefit of different value behavior after pledging shares,charitable donation is just a strategic behavior when other value management behaviors is limited.The paper further disclosure the strategic behavior of controlling shareholders under share pledging,and deepen the understanding of motivation for corporate charitable donation,which have important significance for regulators and investors.
作者
胡珺
彭远怀
宋献中
周林子
HU Jun;PENG Yuan-huai;SONG Xian-zhong;ZHOU Lin-zi(School of Management,Hainan University,Haikou570228,China;School of Management,Jinan University,Guangzhou 510632,China;School of Economics,Hainan University,Haikou570228,China)
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第2期174-192,共19页
China Industrial Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目“环境规制下的企业成本转嫁研究：机制、后果与治理”（批准号71902050）
国家自然科学基金面上项目“社会责任投入权衡、信誉资本和公司价值创造”（批准号71372166）
海南大学科研启动项目“外部性、环境规制与企业成本转嫁”（批准号kyqd(sk)1905）
关键词
控股股东股权质押
控制权转移风险
策略性慈善捐赠
controlling shareholders’share pledging
risk of losing control rights
strategic charitable donation
