摘要
立足于地方政府对粮食生产责任承担与城市化建设的不同激励,通过对县级样本的面板数据进行分析,系统考察了粮食生产责任对地方政府撤县设区的影响。研究发现,现有事关撤县设区决策程序和变更方案内容确定的制度安排,在中国式分权体制下,使得地方政府在推动撤县设区中具有弱化粮食生产责任的制度空间和利益激励,由此进一步使得县域的粮食生产责任与地方政府的撤县设区之间具有显著正向关系,但这一正向关系随着产业结构的优化升级会减弱。
Based on the different incentives for local governments to assume responsibility for grain production and urbanization construction, this paper systematically investigated the impact of grain production responsibility on local governments’ decision on city-county merger. The findings revealed that, under Chinese-style decentralization system, existing institutional arrangements,related to the decision-making procedures for city-county merger and the content determination of change plan, could make local governments have institutional space and interest incentive in weakening grain production responsibility during the process of city-county merger. Therefore, there was a significantly positive relationship between county’s grain production responsibility and local government’s city-county merger because of the existence of institutional space and interest incentive, which can be weakened along with the optimization and upgrading of industrial structure.
作者
李宁
周琦宇
LI Ning;ZHOU Qi-yu(School of Food and Materials,Nanjing University of Finance and Economics,Nanjing 210003;School of Public Administration,Nanjing Agricultural University,Nanjing 210095,China)
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第12期18-33,共16页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(72273060)
国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目(71703063)
江苏省第六期“333”人才工程
江苏省第十五批“六大人才高峰”高层次人才A类项目(JY-016)。
关键词
粮食生产责任
撤县设区
地方政府
制度空间
利益激励
grain production responsibility
city-county merger
local government
institutional space
interest incentive
