摘要
当企业或政府需要搜集一项不可验证信息来为相关决策提供支持时,是委派专门的调查者,还是由执行者同时负责调查,甚至将决策权也授予执行者?本文模型表明,当委托人与执行者偏好差异较小时,会优先寻找专门调查者,但需要存在足够高的防火墙来阻止执行者对调查者的影响活动,确保后者的独立性。否则,如果委托人找不到具有足够独立性的调查者,就会选择完全授权。当委托人与执行者偏好差异较大时,则会直接选择专门调查者这一形式。本文的研究框架及获得的结论可以解释我国国家治理体系中的许多相关现象。
When a piece of unverifiable information is needed for a decision, a firm or government might go to find a professional investigator, allow the executer to investigate as well, or even totally delegate the decision to the executer. We claim that the principal’s choice from the three ways depends on the difficulty for the executer to affect the investigator, taking the preference bias between the principal and executor as given. When the preference bias between the principal and executor is small, the principal would like to hire a professional investigator and report to him, if only there is a “firewall” high enough to deter the investigator from being affected by the executor and guarantee her independence. Otherwise, if the investigator is not independent enough, the principal would completely delegate all rights of information gathering, decision and execution to the executor. When the preference bias is big, the principal would also hire an investigator to gather information. The framework and conclusions of this paper are helpful for understanding many phenomena in China’s governance system.
作者
李石强
LI Shiqiang(School of Economics,University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing,102488)
出处
《中国经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第4期81-93,共13页
China Economic Studies
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目(20BJL028)
中国社会科学院大学2020年校级专项(2020-KYLX04-03)。
关键词
影响活动
防火墙
信息传递
组织形式
国家治理体系
Influence activity
Firewall
Communication
Organization form
Governance system
