摘要
本文利用1984—2017年审计署驻地方特派员办事处的设立时间和地方审计信息,研究了中央审计监督对地方财政违规查处规模的影响。研究结果显示,以审计署驻地方特派员办事处设立为代表的中央审计监督与地方财政违规查处规模呈显著正相关关系,且审计署驻地方特派员办事处设立之后,地方审计机关增加了移送司法机关案件数和司法机关处理案件数。更为重要的是,审计署驻地方特派员办事处专员变更不会产生显著影响,审计署驻地方特派员办事处具有驻地效应。
Based on the information of the establishment of the regional offices of China’s National Audit Office and the audit reports issued by provincial level audit offices from 1984-2017,this paper investigates the effect of central audit supervision on local audit enforcement on misusing public funds.The results show that central audit supervision, represented by the establishment of regional offices of China’s National Audit Office, has a significantly positive correlation with local audit enforcement on misusing public funds.Moreover, after the establishment of regional offices of China’s National Audit Office, provincial level audit offices have increased the number of both cases transferred to the judiciary and cases handled by the judiciary.More importantly, auditor’s turnover will not have a significant impact on the role of central audit supervision and the establishment of the regional offices of China’s National Audit Office has local effect.
作者
吴一平
周彩
杨芳
WU Yiping;ZHOU Cai;YANG Fang(School of Public Economics and Administration,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)
出处
《经济理论与经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第9期52-67,共16页
Economic Theory and Business Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“企业创新的财政激励机制扭曲:形成机制、经济后果与改革策略”(71673174)的资助。
关键词
审计署驻地方特派员办事处
中央审计监督
财政违规查处
regional offices of China’s National Audit Office
central audit supervision
local audit enforcement on misusing public funds
